(pdf; May 27, 2026)
Awards: FTG Best Theory Job Market Paper 2026 (First Prize, link)
Conferences: SITE 2026 (Dynamic Games, Contracts & Markets) (scheduled), FRB Richmond-UVA-Duke Macro Workshop 2025 (PhD session), ESWC 2025, FTG Summer Conference 2025, FIRS 2025 (PhD session), MFS Workshop 2025 (PhD poster session), AFA Annual Meeting 2025 (PhD poster session), EGSC 2024
This paper presents a dynamic model of firm financing where firms use financial slack to reduce rent extraction by financiers with bargaining power. Financing is lumpy because it is optimal to bargain infrequently. Moreover, firms may finance 'early' before exhausting internal funds to bargain when their outside options are better. Financing rents are thus endogenous to firms' dynamic financing strategy. Firms with good financing alternatives raise financing early to reduce rents, whereas firms lacking such alternatives raise financing after exhausting funds to avoid frequently paying endogenously large rents. Investment irreversibility increases financing rents, and disproportionately so for less productive firms.
Firms with better access to (alternative) financing do not necessarily keep less funds, because they may optimally choose to raise funds earlier with more funds (i.e., have higher financing threshold). By doing so, these firms can improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis financiers and reduce financing rents.
Financial Intermediation Rents and the Composition of Startup Innovation
(new draft forthcoming; previously titled "Financing Innovative Assets: Endogenous Concentration in Startup Innovation")
Firm Divergence
Motivation: This project aims to explore business-cycle implications of the distribution of financial slack across firms. Instead of focusing on 'financial accelerator' upon an adverse negative shock, I focus on (i) the cross-section of firms' optimal financing strategies during recessions, (ii) how it affects the aggregate dynamics of acquisitions during recovery, and (iii) how the effect dynamically intensifies the size discrepancy between productive and unproductive firms – and hence, 'divergence.' A brief sketch of the core mechanism: lumpiness of capital reallocation – in the form of acquisitions – interacts with optimal financing strategy under bargaining frictions, and the pattern of this interaction is endogenously heterogeneous across firm productivity.